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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE SIDDOWAY RICHARDS 
' 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HENRY RALPH SIDDOWAY, MARY 
SIDDOVVA Y and BEN MORRISON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11800 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondents concur generally with the statement 
of facts as set forth in Appellant's brief, except that 
certain items do require additional darification. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lands from two entirely separate sources was the 
subject of the partition proceedings to which refer-
ence is made in the Appellant's statement of facts. 
ITr. 11, 12, 13, 14) 
1 
The range land came by distribution through the 1 
will of William H. Siddoway, father of the four son s, 
wherein the range land was given in common to the 
four sons, three in fee, and the share of \Villiam 
Wallace Siddoway in the form of a life estate with 
a remainder over to the Appellant. This property is 
not in dispute. CTr. 11, 12, 13, 14) 
The so-called "McCarrell place," consisting of 
approximately 80 acres of farm ground came by dis-
tribution in common to the four sons from their 
mother's estate, with a fee interest residing in each. 
(Tr. 13, 14) 
The prayer in the partition proceedings called 
for partition in the manner in which the ownership 
thus appeared, a life estate to William \Vallace Siddo-
way in the range land, and a fee interest to William 
Wallace Siddoway in the "McCarrell place." (Tr. 4) 
After the partition proceedings, William \Vallace 
Siddoway conveyed the "McCarrell place" property 
to Benjamin Morrison in fee in payment of a debt 
owed from Siddoway to Morrison. (R. 14) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD THE PO\\rER AND 
AUTHORITY TO CORRECT THE MANIFEST 
ERROR IN THE PARTITION DECREE 
The question posed by the Appellant at Point I 
of her brief, is whether the Court has the rig-ht to 
2 
correct an error in the prior partition proceedings, to 
make the trnth and the record conform. The conten-
tion is that as a matter of law, the court was pre-
cluded from correcting the error. 
The Trial Court having heard and considered the 
evidence documentary and oral on the subject, con-
cluded that an error existed, and that it was of a cler-
ical nature, and that it would be unjust and inequit-
able to permit the appellant to take the land. CR. 81, 
82, 83, 84, 85) 
Rule 60 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
authorizes the Court to correct clerical mistakes in 
judgments at any time. 
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time ... " 
The principle that clerical errors or mistakes are 
not limited to those errors of court personnel only is 
well established. Errors, made by attorneys have 
been recognized as "clerical errors." 
In Hawks u. i'\1.cCormack, 190 Okla. 569, 71 P. 2d 
724, an erroneous journal entry prepared by counsel 
for the defendant and approved by counsel for the 
plaintiff was corrected as a clerical error. 
An oversight in which there was a failure to 
reserve jurisdiction of the court in a written decree 
3 
of divorce was held to be a clerical error in Silva 
Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 57 Nevada 468, 66 P. 2d 422. 
v. 
In the case in re Goldberg's Estate, 10 Cal. 2nd 
709, 76 P. 2d 508, the will in question provided for 
the distribution among four children. The petition 
prayed for distribution to those entitled and the 
decree granted distribution in accordance with the 
terms of the will. However, the decree inadvertently 
omitted one of the children provided for in the will. 
The Court held this to be a clerical error. 
The test of a clerical error appears to be whether 
the Court was exercising judicial discretion in its 
application to the particular matter. Benway vs. 
Benway, 69 Cal. App. 2nd 574, 159 P. 2d 682, and 
cases cited above. 
It seems clear m this case from the evidence 
which was undisputed, that the error came in re-
typing the decree from the pleadings and that no 
judicial discretion was involved. 
Counsel argues in his brief that Rule 60 ( b) pre-
cludes the court from correcting an error in a judg-
ment at any time after 90 days, except for fraud. 
This argument is contrary to the actual wording 
of the rule and is clearly contrary to the intent of 
the rule and the expression of this court in the recent 
case Haner vs. Haner, 13 Utah 2nd 299, 373 P. 2d 
/) 77. 
4 
A fair reading of Rule 60 Cb) indicates that only 
under situations ( 1), (2), ( 3) and ( 4) must the 
motion in the same proceedings be brought within 
three months. Situations under ( 5), ( 6), and ( 7) are 
excluded from the three months provision. 
Following the reasoning in the Haner case, and 
the statement of this court therein, the trial court 
found this to be a case where the processes of justice 
will have been completely thwarted if the entire 
judgment in the partition proceedings were to be 
allowed to stand without correction. 
The result otherwise would be a windfall of 20 
acres of farm land to a party clearly not entitled 
thereto, at the expense of the heirs of Benjamin 
Morrison, Morrison having been deeded the property 
for value during his lifetime. CR. 14, Tr. 23, 24). 
Rule 60 (b) further provides: 
" ... This rules does not limit the power of the 
the court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for ob-
taining any relief from a judgment shall be 
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by 
an independent action." 
Thus it is clear that authorization is granted for ' a motion within the same proceedings or in an 
independent action for relief from a judgment. 
In the present instance, there is no effort to vacate 
the judgment. The substance of the judgment of the 1 
court in the partition suit stands and is affirmed by 
the parties. The only effort is to correct one 
1 
of that judgment which by the evidence was erron-
eous and in need of correction. 
It is also clear that authorization exists within 
the a hove-quoted portion of the rule, for relief to be 
granted for reasons other than fraud on the court, as 1 
argued by the appellant. Haner vs. Haner, 13 Ut. 2d 
299, 373 P. 2d 577. 
Independent of rule 60, however, it is asserted by 
the Respondents, that there is inherent power exist-
ing in the Court to correct its judgments, and that 
even a statutory limitation does not limit the power 
of the court to correct its judgment in a proper case. 
Cazell vs. Cazell, 133 Kans. 766, 3 P. 2d 479; In re 
Goldberg, 10 Cal. 2d 709, 76 P. 2d 508, where the 
statute fixed the period at one year and the correction 
was made 35 years later; In re Gold, 8 N.Y. S. 2d 714i 
Brown v. Cole 196 Ga. 843, 28 S.E. 2d 76; Partch v. 
Baird, 227 Mich. 660, 199 692. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS WERE NOT PRECLUDED BY 
LACHES OR DELAY FROM ASSERTING THE 
RIGHT TO HA VE THE ERROR CORRECTED 
The argument made by appellant relative to 
laches is one which more appropriately should be 
6 
addressed to the lower court before whom this matter 
was tried. 
Respondents recognize the proposition asserted by 
.:-\ppellant. However, the trial court had before it all 
of the facts, including the fact that discovery by 
Respondents of the error came about only after 
appellant began her lawsuit, (Tr. 35, 36) and had 
before it all of the facts pertinent to the delays in 
filing of the answer seeking affirmative relief ( R. 23). 
The trial court ruled upon the matters concern-
ing delay in the discovery of the error and in press-
ing action for relief from the error adversely to the 
appellant. 
1be facts sustain the Court in its order setting 
aside the default and allowing the answer asking 
affirmative relief to be granted. It appears from the 
record that much of the delay was also attributable 
to the appellant. The pre-trial order makes no further 
mention of the question of laches, and it was not an 




THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE LOWER 
COURT IN ITS DECISION TO CORRECT THE 
ERROR IN THE PR OBA TE DECREE 
Although the Appellant states as Point III, that 
"the evidence does not justify finding of mistake " 
'' the burden of the argument at this point is not that 
the evidence does not sustain the findings, but rather, 
that certain evidence should have been excluded be-
cause it violates certain rules of evidence, The Hear-
say Rule, the Dead Man's Statute and the Legal Con-
clusions Rule. 
Appellant fails to point out what oral evidence 
was violative of each or all of these rules of evidence, 
making only the broad generalized assertion that it 
does violate these rules of evidence. 
It is not the intention of Respondents to analyzp 
each answer of each witness in order to sustain each 
ruling of the trial court to matters of evidence, nor 
would it appear to be the duty or Respondents to do 
so. 
r 
It should be pointed out, however, that no objec-
tion was interposed to any of the testimony which 
was admitted on the basis of hearsay, or on the basis 
of the dead man's statute, and that on only two 
occasions did the appellant object to evidence on the 
ground that it was testimony about a legal con-
1 · I11 each instance the answer was given prior c us10n. 
8 
to the objection, and in neither instance did counsel 
ask that the testimony be stricken. In the one 
instance, cross examination, without objection, went 
into the same subject matter. (Tr. 33, 34, 35) 
In the other instance, Anna B. Morrison who was 
the secretary who typed the findings and decree testi-
fied that the inclusion of the twenty acres in the 
decree with a remainder over to Elaine S. Richards 
was an error CTr. 37). An objection was interposed to 
her answer, but no request was made that it be 
stricken. (Since it is apparent that as the typist she 
knew whether she had made an error in putting the 
document together, it would not appear that this 
testimony would be in the nature of an objectionable 
conclusion in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that in this matter the 
Trial Court correctly applied the law to the facts and 
corrected what would otherwise have been a manifest 
injustice, and that the judgment of the Trial Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLTON & HAMMOND 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Vernal, Utah 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
On the brief 
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